The relevance of different concepts of computer software (henceforth SW) rights is analysed from the viewpoint of divergent sociopolitical doctrines. The question of software rights is considered from the ontological assumptions, on one extreme, to the relevance of current practical applications of SW rights (such as copyright and patent), on the other extreme. It will be argued (from a non-descriptive/non-cognitive account) that the current expression of SW rights in Western societies (namely copyright, excluding patent) can be seen to be fair from the viewpoint of the theses of agreed rights and universalisability. Finally, given that such practice is neither immoral, nor irrelevant -but fair (based on the ad ignorantiam argument) -we have good reason to respect it rather than violate or demolish it.
Introduction
One of the most controversial aspects of computer ethics is the unauthorised copying of software. Owing to its gradually increasing role in the political economy (Quirchmayr, 1997; Severson, 1997) , unauthorised copying is covered (and banned) by Western legislation and by most professional codes of conduct in the IT/computing field. 1 Because of such concern several organisations, such as BSA, have been ~For example, ACM code 1.5 'Honour property rights including copyrights and patent' and BCS 'Acknowledge and protect intellectual property' cover copyrighted software. almost unavoidable ethical conflicts.4 It has also been suggested that amoral behaviour with respect to computing occurs partly because people have customary/conventional moral notions (in terms of Hare, 1952 Hare, , 1981 Taylor, 1975 ) that do not cover such issues as unauthorised copying of software (Siponen and Kajava, 1998) . The difference between a conceptual muddle and the latter argument is that conceptual muddles are related to, for example, lack of legislation or conventional morals, while the latter viewpoint argues that moral aspects concerning computing are not covered by conventional moral notions (whatever they may be based on, e.g. education, environment or upbringing). And because people possess conventional knowledge, they might not be able to go beyond it in order to search for moral evidence. Severson (1997) agrees: we have a moral crisis, not a legal one.
The debate concerning software as an intellectual property can be divided into two areas. In the first area, people are concerned about questions such as what aspects of SW are copyrightable, or which elements of SW should be covered by patents, if any at all. The other category and objective of this study encompasses questions concerning the morality of unauthorised copying of software, i.e., is it morally acceptable (e.g. for companies or individual people) to electrically copy commercial software protected by copyright forbidding the testing of the SW? Traditionally, computer ethicists have considered unauthorised copying of software as immoral (Weckert, 1997) . However, according to Weckert (1997; Weckert and Adeney, 1997; Stallman, 1995 Stallman, , 1997 Nissenbaum, 1995) this is dogmatic belief (i.e. it has been created without a critical perusal).
The objective of the paper is (1) to put forth different avenues for the justification or the abolition of SW rights; (2) to critically analyse the so-called claims for 'free SW', and 'no SW rights' by Stallman (1995 Stallman ( , 1997 , including their problems; (3) to address the problems of 'landlord analogy' by Nissenbaum (1995) ; (4) to explore the weakness based on non-exclusiveness argument (e.g. Weckert, (1997) ; (5) to consider certain moral foundations of patents and copyrights; and (6) to consider the implications of non-commercial SW. Finally, this paper attempts (7) to justify the concept of 'copyright' (as it applies to SW) on the grounds of non-descriptivism (widely referred to, wrongly, as non-cognitivism, e.g. Hare, 1976) , particularly using the universality thesis and doctrine of agreed rights.
In other words, the perspective of this study is set at a general and society level, the objective being to explore the moral foundations of legislation (to provide a framework in which its relevance can be analysed or debated) and to serve as a starting point for individual moral reflections with respect to SW questions (e.g. should we copy SW?). In addition to logical analyses, the different views on rights will be analysed in the light of artificial case studies. Conceptual analysis in terms of Jarvinen (1997) will be used as the primary research method, since objective empirical studies are almost impossible to carry out. In practice, we cannot do experimental studies to measure the effects of different solutions and compare these with other similar experiments, for instance. To address issues above, an alternative for traditional linear inference, as proposed by Popper (1957) for science in general and later Hare (1963 Hare ( , 1999 for moral purposes, is adapted. This 'coherentist 4When the moral foundations of such rights are clear it is far easier to consider their legal status, for instance whether they should be covered by patent or copyright claims or excluded from the legislation. The universality theses and major critiques 2.3
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reasoning', as Hare (1999: 124) calls it, means that we find and justify moral principles and judgements by testing them in the light of facts.
There are some schools of thought that are left out of the discussion, namely religious ethics, cultural relativism and ethics based on intuition. The systems based on intuition and cultural relativism are left out in this paper because it is considered impossible to debate about morality issues within moral philosophy if everyone can only appeal to their intuition or sociological facts (i.e. local legislation or local habits). In other words, participants in this discussion should abide by the following rules. All have to prove explicitly that the values and beliefs they advocate stand up to closer inspection proved by conceptual analysis. This approach may not yield the absolute truth, but rather tries to discern it within the denomination of moral philosophy, i.e. 'rational' inquiries. Table 1 describes the structure of the paper, i.e. how this paper attempts to cover the very motley debate on the relevance of software rights, This paper is organised as follows. The second section starts by outlining the philosophical framework related to rights on a general level. The universality thesis will be critically considered. Then, the relevance of the 'no rights' view and some problems related to the thesis that 'SW is/should be free' are outlined. The concepts of patent and copyright, including criticism they have faced, are considered, and the feasible and desirable effects of non-commercial SW are considered at the end of this Section. The third section outlines the key issues of the paper.
Software Rights

On the Foundations of Rights and SW Rights
Software rights (henceforth referred to as SW rights) is a concept inherited from liberal thought, a variant and/or subclass of intellectual property rights (IPR for short), which include intellectual work such as books, articles, music, video, protected by a certain right for a certain control. Compared with rights that apply to tangible (or physical) entities, the concept of IPR is further complicated in many senses mainly due to the intangible nature of IPR, and SW rights as a subclass do not clarify it in this respect. SW rights differ from other IPR (e.g. Snapper, 1995) , and are therefore likely to arouse additional antithetical views (not previously encountered with other rights; Snapper, 1995) , starting out from the ontological foundation of such rights and continuing to the pragmatic interpretation of their relevance to everyday life. 5 Before any ontological dimensions of SW rights can be constructed on which any practical reflection can be based, the realm of IPR and rights generally needs to be described.
First, the different ontological schemes for rights can be classified in a threefold manner into (i) inherited rights that are already there (deemed to be set by God or by nature and regarded as absolutely and eternally valid); (ii) agreed rights, i.e. rights that are based on agreements between people; and (iii) no rights (whatsoever). 6
The last of these -no rights -is perhaps the less shared view, although its foundations can be argued in an interesting way. That is to say, if there are no rights whatsoever, it could be argued that there is no violation of rights as there are no rights to violate. Although this can be further justified by stating that there is less violation of rights in the 'no rights' case than in other systems, it includes an absurdity if viewed pragmatically as (a) ordered human life seems to need rights as they are a metaphysical basis for a moral life (Airaksinen, 1987) and (b) if situation i or ii is valid, actions leading towards a 'no rights' situation are likely to yield a violation of rights. This objection to 'no rights', although it is not fatal, can be directed at both IPR and 'normal' rights. The relevance of a 'no rights' situation depends on the type of rights. Most people would perhaps regard the right to life, for instance, as valid and intuitively unavoidable (there has to be right to life; so that a 'no rights' situation, if it were to deny the right to life, is likely to be considered invalid), whereas in the case of IPR, the type iii 'no rights' situation is more commonly accepted, as the maxims 'SW is/should be free', 'information is/should be free', 'electrons are/should be free' indicate (e.g. Kallman and Grillo, 1993) . The difference between these arguments and their meanings will be considered later.
In the case of SW rights, (i) 'no rights -SW is totally free' is the first ontological view that needs to be considered. Other such schemes concerned with SW include Floridi, (1998a Floridi, ( , 1998b , and (iii) the author or a certain person or company has certain rights over SW. The difference between these two is that the latter relates to a subject and often denies or ignores the intrinsic rights inherent in SW itself, while the former (ii) concentrates more on objects, as it values their intrinsic (moral) worth given that SW is an information entity, i.e. a concise packet of information according to IE. If the 'no rights' view is adopted, i.e. SW does not entail any intrinsic rights (including the assumption that it has no degree of moral worth in terms of IE), nor can entities (individuals, companies, etc.) 
The Elements of Right
The concept of rights, irrespective of the outlined ontological assumptions, involves the concepts of claims, freedom and responsibility. Rights give a certain freedom, e.g. to determine one's own business, at least in certain respects, and secondly, they are (justified) demands for something with regard to other people. Thirdly, if one presents justified demands of the above kind, e.g. concerning one's freedom to determine one's own business, this involves at least indirectly the claim that other people have the responsibility to respect it, and not to violate it, for instance. In addition to these issues that form logical elements of the concept of rights, there are other conditions, including feasible and desirable aspects in terms of sociopolitical theories. To start with the scheme of natural rights, it is difficult to perceive natural rights that intuitively indicate the relevance of IPR or SW rights. However, it could be argued on these grounds that it is or is not natural for one to claim control over one's creations (or argue that SW entails intrinsic rights in a natural sense that must be respected). This viewpoint unites one category of liberalism (classical liberals, i.e. libertarians) with the generally communitarian school of thought. The community of libertarians holds views of 'rights as entitlements', stating that everyone has the right to get what he/she deserves, regardless of whether the assets are natural or obtained in other ways, e.g. as personal property. The communitarian school sees that our background indicates how things should be, or how we should organise society (e.g. Sandel, 1982) . In addition to these, there are other schools such as modern liberals and socialism, which could be separated from the libertarian 7 and communitarian views by the fact that they try to find preferred, justified, equal and fair situations that are not dependent on earlier events or history (and are therefore contrary to the communitarian view). Many may view the communitarian school as not being a persuasive stand, as it rejects the analysis of 'what is preferred' and replaces it with a factual inspection of 'what we are'. In other words, it aims to answer questions 'what we should do' or 'how things should be' by carrying on a kind of historical review to explore empirically how things have been (and allowing this to determine 'how things should be'). This can be seen as problematic, as how can such a reference to human activity 8 ensure that this is what we should ultimately do?
The advocates of socialism seem to be a minority among computer ethical scholars while, ironically, many studies indicate that most people seem to favour socialism, at least when it comes to SW issues (presuming that they are rational), as indicated by the desire to abolish SW rights.
The Universality Thesis
One of the principles used to find a desirable state of affairs and restrict excessively egoistic claims of rights is the universalisability of moral judgements. This simply means that if one judges that one's action in a particular situation is right, one must acknowledge that a similar act by anybody else in a similar situation would also be right. Therefore, the principle of universality paves the way for equality. Variations on this are used by Rawls (1971) and Gewirth, for example (with regard to sociopolitical theory), along with many ethical principles and doctrines, including Kantian ethics, Jewish-Christian ethics (e.g. the Golden Rule in the case of Christian ethics), Confucian ethics and Hare's universal prescriptivism (e.g. Hare, 1981) . Gewirth (1978) has tried to argue for the need for rights and their relevance with the help of universality. In his view, an action requires that one appreciates the features of this action. If one does so, equally, one has no relevant reasons to deny others that action. According to Gewirth, this implies the relevance, rationality and justness of using rights. Also (as Gewirth's thesis indicates), in the eyes of the fullblooded egoist, the thesis of universality can be seen as rational. For example, if we do not know our situation (i.e. status, sex, age, etc.) while choosing the principles of the structure of society, as in the case of the 'veil of ignorance' invoked by Rawls (1971) , a universality standpoint can be argued to ensure equality -the situation is held to be impartial. For instance, an egoistic person (who likes to use others' SW, violating the copyright) may think, on the grounds of universality, that if there are no SW rights it is possible for someone to copy his/her SW or the advantage of his/ her work, too. This kind of deliberation that relies on universality, albeit rational and equal in the sense that it removes egoistic behaviour, may not indicate that the chosen state of affairs is the right one or the best possible, as it merely reflects the preferences of certain people. However, the universality thesis could be reasoned rather persuasiveIy: if the chosen situation were what people prefer as being right 7Whether principled or pragmatic libertarians. 8Humans make mistakes, for example, and thus merely the reference to human activities as such seems to be a questionable qualifier for justifying our actions. and just (this idea is very similar to Rawls' justification of the 'justice as fairness' doctrine), what else would we need? If we presume that a certain situation is favoured by all the participants involved, although that is not often likely to be the case, we may still ask whether this is the right one, or more precisely the best one, as our actions, what we do or choose, do not necessary indicate that the situation is right.
They indicate only what we actually do, and not necessarily what we objectively should do. Consider Hume's law, 'no ought from an is', for example.
It has been argued that Rawls' 'veil of ignorance' constitutes a 'radically disembodied subject' (Sandel, 1982: 21) who is incapable of making rational choices. Firstly we, in Sandel's view, cannot be independent agents without particular values and social commitments. Secondly, he maintains that we must ask 'Who am I?' while in Rawls' view the pertinent question is 'What do I prefer?' The aforementioned objection by Sandel as per se is not free from weaknesses. Firstly, even if one can identify one's community or one can be identified by one's position within it, it doesn't mean that one's context defines who one is (Kukathas and Pettit, 1990: 108) . Consider person X, raised by five different foster parents in different countries (and X remembers only two of them), while X's original mother is Asian and the father is black.
In addition to this, Sandel's argument that the end of moral reasoning is not judgement but self-discovery isn't very convincing. Hence, self-discovery doesn't replace moral judgement about how one should live. For example C.S. Lewis, who had deeply held atheist beliefs, was once forced to examine the question of unauthorised copying of SW. In Sandel's account ('Who am I?') the conclusion of this 'moral' survey was nothing more than 'I am an English atheist' (example modified from Kukathas and Pettit, 1990: 109) . Equally, we can all reply to this question by saying 'This is what we are' without engaging in the activity of moral reasoning.
Even the Sandel-like viewpoint seems inadequate per se, as based on Sandel (concerning also the universality of moral judgements) it can be argued that we are not able to reach the objective stage; our judgements are more or less subjective and biased (in other words they will always reflect our background). That is to say, merely the independence of position can be difficult to achieve, with the result that 'impartial' universalisability of moral judgements approaches the version provided by Kant, Confucianism, etc. (see Table 3 for a division between 'partial' and 'impartial' theses). The 'partial' interpretation of the principle of universality contains subjective constraints, i.e. they may search for a solution that only they would prefer, as in theory there may be as many viewpoints as there are individuals. For example, the Kantian type of universality -act using only those maxims which can become universal laws -can be passed by a 15-year-old schoolboy when he sets up a maxim (M1) '15-year-old boys that hold grade 5 Swedish can copy software'. It is difficult to claim that such indicators as 15 years old, boy and grade 5 in Swedish count for much here. Simply, for the above reasons, the universalilisability of moral judgements such as the one proposed by Hare or Rawls is argued to be independent of age, gender etc. and would interpret M1 as 'Is it right that everybody can copy software ?' However, from the moral point of view even the latter impartial type of universality might result in that although there would be only a single person who considers a certain action as right while everybody else in the world considers it inherently Floridi (1998 Floridi ( , 1999 Traditional view: e.g. Johnson (1994) , Langford (1995) , Mason (1985) MacIntyre (1986) argues that the universality does not allow any supererogative actions and also requires other people to act in a certain way, which involves a kind of hubris. Consider the case of Kantian universality, act as a 'universal legislator'. Since the moral judgement applies to all (universally), it is not supererogative, but the action in question is required. Thence, MacIntyre asks who has a right to be such a universal legislator. Even we may share this concern; however, although supererogation is an admirable concept in theory since it, for example, offers flexibility and tolerance that may be necessary for social life, the universalisability of moral judgements is more practical and just. Hence, supererogation may lead to a situation where every activity X is accepted in a sense; at any rate activity X cannot be required, because its non-occurrence isn't morally wrong. In reality this is a problem, at least when someone wants to kill us -and in light of supererogation we cannot be denied it.
Therefore, as mentioned, universalisability of moral judgements offers equality and a certain degree of justness, although on subjective grounds. Nevertheless, this may be the best that we can do, at least within the realm of moral philosophy.
Utilitarianism
The utilitarianism act calculates what action produces the greatest amount of happiness on the whole. Thus, if people were happier with free software, including its consequences, then the SW should be free. Some of these consequences will be considered in Section 2.7. However, such calculations do not reveal whether the happiness of n + 1 very happy software pirates is greater than the happiness of n amount of moderately happy SW owners. Neither does utilitarianism cover such issues as whether the opinions of all people are equal or not -even the opinion of a person whose idea seems to be inherently unfair. Rule utilitarianism would simply regard unauthorised copying either as immoral or morally right.
Act utilitarianism can be easily used to justify copying of Microsoft's software, for example. Presume that there is a poor person B and a very wealthy company M. B wants to steal from M, and B-like persons are the only persons that ask: 'Can we steal SW made by M?' Does B have a moral right to steal M's SW? The answer is yes, given that we use act utilitarianism as a moral qualifier. Stealing increases B's happiness, and does not decrease the happiness of society either, because, if B takes a little from rich companies (such as M), their wealth will decrease only in figures, not in terms of real property. Thus, the level of happiness would increase as B improved his happiness, and no one else's happiness would decrease. Therefore that action would be justified from the point of view of act utilitarianism.
As indicated earlier, utilitarianism is a problematic theory since it does not consider sufficiently the preferences of individuals, as we shall see. The avoidance of pain and suffering is a far more important goal than the achievement of a balance of happiness over unhappiness (Warburton, 1996) . A world in which no one was particularly happy, but no one suffered extreme pain either, would obviously be more appealing than one in which some people suffered extreme unhappiness, while others experienced great contentment and happiness. One way to meet this objection is to modify utilitarianism into what is known as negative utilitarianism. In this approach, the best action in any circumstances is the one which produces the least overall amount of unhappiness. However, the best way of eliminating all suffering in the world would be to eliminate all sentient life. If there were no beings capable of feeling pain, then, obviously, there would be no pain. Naturally, this kind of elimination should happen in a painless way, e.g., by means of a huge atomic explosion. According to the principle of negative utilitarianism, this would be a morally right action. And even if a certain amount of pain were involved in this process, the longterm benefits in pain elimination would probably outweigh it (Warburton, 1996) . This is quite difficult to accept. To conclude, all these utilitarianism-based arguments fail to take into account the rights and preferences of individuals.
'No Rights' Claims Concerning SW
The difference between the 'no software rights' and 'free software' claims should be clarified, although they are often used as synonyms in a sense that fully amoralises software (e.g. by Stallman, 1995 Stallman, , 1997 . This amoral nature of SW is a counterintuitive viewpoint if it argues that SW is devoid of any rights, 9 or if it maintains that moral reflections should not be extended to issues involving an occurrence of SW. This kind of amoralisation would lead to a situation where every action with respect to SW is acceptable simply because SW is amoral, i.e. there are no rights attached to it. In other words, irrespective of the situation in question, SW has 9This does not mean that SW per se is amoral, nor is it a statement arguing that SW entails intrinsic rights. It states that the occurrence of SW amoralises the issues in question. no degree of moral worth. This is difficult to perceive, as there is SW in which modification or deleting seems to be inherently wrong, for instance. Consider, for example, (1) deletion of an aircraft SW system which would lead directly to an air crash; or (2) how about the modification of a nuclear weapons system or nuclear power plant, resulting in the death of innocent people? These two examples should indicate that software cannot be totally free from the realm of rights or an amoral area, extending the scope of amorality to cover the context as well. Most of us would not accept that such could become a universal law (using the Kantian version of the universality principle). Note that prohibition of deletion or modification (in case 1, for example) seems to imply either (i) attached rights or moral worth that (after deliberation) forbids such deletions or modifications; or (ii) that SW per se is value-neutral, but that the context is not amoral; thus, the actions of the agent who is in contact with the SW can and should be analysed from a moral point of view. Therefore, we need to clarify the meaning of free SW as follows.
The maxims 'free software', 'software wants to be free' or 'software should be free' are used in an unspecified manner which is most likely to argue that SW rights (explicitly, the right of ownership) should not be recognised in a financial manner (via a licence payment), or according to another view, that SW should be free of rights so that one can modify, copy or distribute it without violation of rights. Stallman (1997) , for example, seems to be in favour of these views. The aforementioned interpretation of the 'free SW' thesis is also problematic, however, as examples 1 and 2 indicate. To be more precise, what is the scope of free SW?
The 'SW should be free' manifestation does not indicate as such whether SW should be free of all (attached) rights, copyrights, patents, etc. Although the explicit scope of 'free' is unspecified, it is often justified by 'no harm' or feasible and desirable types of arguments in terms of political theory (an example of such an approach is used by Stallman, 1995 , and analysed in Section 2.7). 'No harm' types of argument are difficult to analyse, however, if the scope of 'free' is not expressed (again as examples 1 and 2 show). The problems related to this unspecified nature may be overcome, for instance, by stating that 'free' signifies the abolishment of financial licences (whether related to copyrights or patents), i.e. SW should be free in terms of finance (as well as excluding other meanings). This claim can be seen in the light of the division presented in the first section above. The first category encompasses issues such as whether SW rights should be established in terms of financial acknowledgement or whether one has a right to claim a financial reward for one's SW. As mentioned, legislation is -ideally -one of the main instances applying this information in practice. The second category is more of an individual level, relating to issues such as whether we should copy SW in such a 'free' manner.
There is also another approach with respect to the claim that 'SW is/should/ wants to be free' which, in theory, can be advocated with the help of a theory of information ethics (IE) by Floridi (1999) , although no such a strategy has been presented as of yet. In this case, one could maintain that SW has intrinsic moral worth that should be respected and that as 'SW wants to be free', we should respect this, too. It is, of course, rather debatable whether the 'SW wants to be free' or, to put it another way, even though the view of SW as an object of moral respect per se (as it is a being of infosphere) is accepted, it may not follow as the only logical possibility available that the expression of the moral respect of SW is to ~let it be free' e.g. in the manner put forth by Stallman. Weckert (1997) stated that SW, like any other intellectual property, is intangible and thus a non-exclusive entity. Adhering to that perspective, it is claimed that one is not stealing or doing anything morally wrong or breaking anyone's rights merely by taking copies of someone's SW. The person concerned does not, according to these persons, lose the SW. It can be further maintained that in this way the SW owner can continue to have the software as will everybody else, as well (Weckert, 1997) . It is true that in terms of material or implementation SW is a non-exclusive entity. But there is another dimension of 'nonexclusiveness' that is questionable, perhaps independent of implementation, and it is this second dimension that we should concentrate on. The first, the implementation/material dimension, concerns the instance of the entity per se, while the latter has to do with the rights. It is valid that, in the case of electronic copying, due to non-exclusiveness the owner of the SW does not lose the instance of the SW entity per se (i.e. does not lose his/her personal instance of the software). The other 'moral dimension' relates to possible rights: are our rights (if we have rights at all) non-exclusive? Are our rights dependent upon such implementation matters? If the free SW claim based on non-exclusive argument is accepted, it seems to lead to questionable situations. Consider, for example, the presupposed right to informational privacy, which would be lost. After all, information is non-exclusive, and therefore all our personal information, including naked pictures, should be made freely available: in this way, we as the owners, can continue to have the information, as well everyone else! Why isn't this argument based on the non-exclusive nature of information persuasive? We may try to object to the non-exclusiveness argument with the viewpoint of 'rights that are already there', 'agreed rights' and with the help of the universalisability thesis. In the case of SW, the 'already there' right is difficult to justify, namely, how would you prove such an 'already there' right correct?
The agreed right approach is much easier to pursue, as seen from Section 2.3. In that account, one may claim that the non-exclusive argument involves an infringement of agreed right. First one may deliberate through the universalisability thesis 'What if everybody did it?' It is likely that most of us would deny the non-exclusiveness argument in light of the universality thesis. Given that this is valid, we have a good reason to say that we live in a society where conforming to agreed rights is expected, given that they are justified and fair -herein justified by the universality thesis above. Otherwise we may have difficulties to live in a harmonised society. The objection to the agreed right argument stating that acknowledgement of the author by other means without payment of licence fee is also an indication of respect of one's right goes at least a little amiss. Of course it is true that there are other forms of acknowledgement in addition to financial acknowledgement. However, with respect to agreed rights, this is not the issue. Such action would still be a violation of an agreed right. How would you like it if after an agreement of certain arrangements with respect to your creation it would be acceptable to people to break it, even without your knowing it?
On the Moral Background of Patents and Copyrights
The key issue with respect to the morality status of matters concerning software is the relevance of rights that would give adequate reason for one to claim a certain authority over one's assets, in this case SW. Computer ethicists have often justified this claim, as in the case of 'free SW' the owner of the SW will lose certain control over his/her assets. This has been further justified by stating that the production of SW requires a lot of effort and time, so that it seems wrong to take the fruit of this labour and pay nothing for it, as Langford (1995) and others have argued. Consequently, the mainstream of computer ethicists have postulated the validity of SW rights in a subjective 1~ sense, n In other words, they have not appreciated 'free software' as, (1) it constitutes a violation of someone else's rights, and (2) because they, as rightful owners of the software, are denied a certain control over their assets, often a financial reward. Case 1 already presumes that there are rights such as IPR, and therefore easily leads to circuit inference.
Another possible approach, suggested by some of my students in the computer ethics examination and also mentioned by Jakonen (1999) , is the claim on the grounds of IE theory that software is one's 'private' information which is a part of 'one'-hood and it should therefore be a matter of one's own control. This idea is possible to pursue further, at least provided that IE do not limit the type of 'private' information (i.e. SW can be 'private information', a part of 'one'-hood), and the manipulation of such information is a performative treatment. Hence, so far as my (self-produced) SW is regarded as a part of me-hood it may be wrong, at least in the account of IE, to use it (in any sense) without my knowledge, as this action would violate my integrity and neglect that kind of moral respect of which I should be worth. This view may not be entirely self-evident, however. For example, information related to SW that one has developed may not be one's own; rather, for instance, borrowed and learned from different quarters (as outlined by Kuhn, although in a different context, and will be considered later in this paper). This debate of whether IE can be safely used to pursue this kind of claim will be left out for further investigations, as it is currently rather premature to apply IE.
As mentioned in the case of rights, equality was argued to a be key issue (recall Section 2.3 on the universalisability thesis). This means in practice that our rights should be equal in a certain sense that comes close to the universality thesis; i.e. if a person X has a right R, it is reasonable that everybody else (in a similar situation) should also have the right R (at least in a general sense) or, conversely, if person X is denied right R, everyone else should be denied it, too. Other situations are difficult to justify, namely why person X should be in a different position from person Y or vice versa, for instance. Here the issue of partial and impartial universality theses becomes important. Imagine two persons, a person owning a SW company and a person who is sure that they would never be involved in making SW. The first 1~ moral discourse, this stands for a view holding that it is the preference of subjects (authors of SW) that matters (Floridi, 1999) . tOn the very opposite side, Stallman suggests that reward should be measured in terms of social contributions and if people deserve to be rewarded, 'by the same token they deserve to be punished if they restrict the use of these programs' (Stallman, 1997: 234 and accept the action without difficulty. The weakness of both of these is that they likely involve subjective/partial universality. In the first case, the one making a judgement is placed on the shoes of owner of the SW company, for example. The second person's view may be partial in a sense that they may not take into account what would happen if everybody, universally, were to do this. And this, 'What if everybody (universally) did it?' is what we should ask.
This viewpoint is not taken into account by an argument maintaining that there is no harm in copying material that we would not buy (ibid., 1997). But how do we know that we would not buy some SW? Why would we copy SW, if we never thought of buying it? Consider the following story. Person A has 677 programs on his computer, but he is sure that he would never buy any of them. Is A morally right in using those programs? Additionally, is it acceptable that if one would never buy SW, one uses an accounting program, for instance (otherwise one would have to do this accounting manually). And what if someone claimed that he will never buy a program, and if he cannot copy a suitable program, he will write one? And what if SW is used for purely personal purposes (like playing games or accounting) or for studying? Is it always right, even if one is absolutely certain that one would never buy SW? If not, where do we draw the line? Weckert (1997) considers it right to use a statement like 'But what if everyone did this?' as a way of satisfying the universalisability principle. However, this claim is problematic (the statement is both subject and occupation oriented -the avoidance of which should be one of the objectives of the principle). Or consider the following example of universalisability: 'One should act as though one was legislating for everyone.' If the person making this rule owned an SW company, he would probably think twice about it. R.M. Hare (1981) maintains that in this case we should ask ourselves 'if I were the victim and had all the characteristics of my present victim [SW author] including his preferences', and consider if copying is morally right. If one really considered the preferences of the SW author, the answer would probably be 'No'. Anyhow, whenever the universalisability principle is applied to a case, we must keep from tailoring our principles to suit a particular role in disregard of other roles (e.g. Hare, 1981) . Having considered these aspects, the matter is not as self-evident as Weckert (1997) argues. Thus, having considered the universalisability of moral judgement, we may quite rationally regard SW copying as an unwanted activity (rather than a right activity).
The problem of monopoly is a recognised weakness (Kuftik, 1995; Weckert, 1997) . Namely, it is rather different to claim full control over SW than to claim full control over the idea behind of it. The view emphasising full control over SW is likely to be a more persuasive one, as full control over the idea behind it can cause a monopoly, with undesirable results. In that light, it seems reasonable that the author (of SW) should not properly be able to claim full control over the idea behind it -otherwise our freedom of thought and speech would be threatened.
This seems to be taken into account by the majority of (Western) legislation systems, as in the case of SW the owners have a right to their practical application (Kuflik, 1995: 171) and traditionally everybody has the right to build their own application in their own way. However, in addition to preventing others from making, selling and using (verbatim) copies of the SW (as ensured under a copyright), many companies also want to prevent utilisation of the functionality of the SW (as guaranteed under a patent) le (Kirsch, 1998: 324) , which raises the following controversies. On the one hand, the inventor of innovation X should be acknowledged in some manner. On the other hand, to grant the inventor almost full control for a certain time over something that he has discovered during an earlier period of time (and perhaps put into some form of product) would not be fair (Kuflik, 1995: 174) at least (i) to those persons who would have discovered X a second later, (ii) in the case of some important development that has a significant effect on our well-being, (iii) because no invention is fully one's own 13 or (iv) since it may lead to monopoly. Note that the copyright practices that currently apply to normal off-the-shelf software are unlikely to cause the problems mentioned above, which are common in the case of patents (since everyone can make their own product and be acknowledged for it). Patents, as least in the forms recognised in Western society, are not likely to violate freedom of thought. In the case of SW, for example, if a certain algorithm is recognised in terms of a patent, this patent legally protects only the use of the same (kind of) algorithm in computers. In other words, we can still write the algorithm on paper and consider it in our minds without having violated the patent.
Thus far, the issue of control over the idea behind SW has been dealt with, but the situation of whether the author should have full or limited control over the practical application of the idea, i.e. the software itself, has been left open. In other words, in legal terms, what is the scope of the copyright? Can the author hold full control over SW (in practice, be rewarded for every instance of its use) or should we limit such claims? One attempt to limit these claims (and even remove the ground from beneath all claims for control over SW) is put forward by Stallman (1997) , who sees that copyright enforcement also harms society materially and intellectually, as the simplest way of obtaining SW is copying it from a neighbour (this is an important point, for if such claims cause only harm, we do not have much reason to maintain such a system). However, it can equally be asked whether the use or utilisation of another' s creations (SW) without permission harms society in the way described by Stallman.
The situation is rather similar to my surreptitiously using my neighbour's car in the middle of the night as he/she has a hire service and this is the easiest way to obtain (say) a cigarette. Assuming that I refill the tank to the same level and cause no other depreciation to the car, is it right? It is the easiest way of achieving of what I want and my neighbour does not lose anything more than the financial reward that he/she wishes to gain from his car hire service. Nissenbaum (1995, p. 210 ) uses a landlord analogy to argue that once an apartment is leased, the landlord's right of entry is limited by the occupant's right for privacy.
12In juridical terms a trademark is also used in the case of SW, e.g. to ensure recognition or to maintain the image of the creator. Trademark issues are not covered in this study.
13According to Kuflik (1995, p. 175) , the invention of something does not entirely originate in one's own mental resources. Helpful information may have been gathered from different sources, possibly with assistance from someone else.
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Similarly, because people should be largely unrestricted in the private domain, the moral rights of programmers should not extend into it. As a consequence, anyone who bought a program should be allowed to copy it to someone else such as a relative or a family friend (Nissenbanm, 1995) . The first question that arises in this context is whether technical solutions that protect SW against unlicensed copying are immoral as they seem to extend into the private domain. Secondly, does the analogy prohibit that having sold a program the author should not enter the customer' s private domain at will to check, e.g., whether he follows the licence agreement? Anyhow, the landlord analogy can be objected to from the viewpoint of contractual/ agreed rights. If the occupant commits himself (and he is free to choose) to a tenancy agreement that prohibits him from letting other people occupy the apartment permanently, then, clearly, he should abide by the agreement (even though he would not benefit financially by letting some else live in the apartment), except in the case of emergency. If one is free to choose and knows the conditions of the agreement, it is hard to find an acceptable reason to break the conditions (however, people are not always aware of them, perhaps because some companies print them in small print).
Economic and Social Effects of Non-Commercial SW
It may be possible to organise a society without certain personal rights such as copyright. Stallman (1995: 191) , for instance, argues persuasively that it is a common fallacy to see only two outcomes: proprietary software (i.e. a liberal society based on software practice), or no software available. There are intermediate forms; however, the examination concerning the relevance of such systems cannot be explored fully here. It will be partly examined in due course, however, for those interested in changing the current system, perhaps towards a sociopolitical state of affairs in which the government owns the means of production. According to Stallman (1995) , it also is a commonly viewed fallacy that if software were free (i.e. there were no copyright on it), hardly anyone would want to acquire it, the end result being that no one would develop it or offer it for the public. Even though many companies and people do profit from licence fees, the work is done for free in some quarters (e.g. for fun, for the challenge, or for the reputation), or is based on an obligatory payment by the clients. To approach this question as a point of view on the relevance of rights with respect to feasible and desirable facets, we have to ask what would happen if no one needed to buy SW, as everybody was able to copy it for flee. Would we prefer this as being feasible and more desirable than the opposite state of affairs?
This would lead to a situation where (A) there were no IP rights, so that the software industry would be based on voluntary activity for which payment by the client was optional; (B) the government or a third party would directly or indirectly cover the cost of software and distribute it to members of society. It is clear that as a result of this arrangement the whole software industry would come tumbling down, unless it were able to change its operating principles, or unless there were sociopolitical changes. Such changes will be considered next. Weckert (1997) argued that the kind of public domain of SW similar to case (A) may work well, since academics, artists and scholars have been creative without material rewards throughout history (and free SW are therefore justified). This statement (relying on an induction of a kind) contains certain weaknesses. First and foremost, it violates Hume's law 'No ought from an is' as it relies on factual matters or uses 'is' matter as premises for inference (without value premises). In other words, our main interest in terms of sociopolitical approaches does not lie in 'this has been done', or in finding 'work well' situations, but rather is it targeted to exploring what is the most desirable and feasible situation (consider the weakness of Sandel's argument in Section 2.2). Moreover, such induction, as used by Weckert (1997) , is problematic, as Hume has first shown: the 'It has worked well in the past' argument itself relies on the induction and thus begs the question (circular argument, petitio principii).
Also, if copyright as a right to material rewards were suddenly abolished (as in case A), it would cause everyday practices to move towards a situation in which 'the laws of the jungle' prevailed. The abolition of rights which have existed so far would cause a situation in which anyone could benefit from work already done by others, resulting in inequality.
Secondly, many artists make a living from their artistic work. Do you personally like the music of performers who don't do it for living? Furthermore, at least in the field of computing, the academic world is most likely to receive some of the money generated by the SW industry. 14 Also, if people don't do it for financial reasons, does it mean that they don't want to do so (or they should not do so)? Don't most of the talented ice hockey or football players want to be paid more than is necessary for a reasonable living? Is it really the case that the best musicians and computer programmers do not want to receive financial rewards? Indeed, one reason why the whole computer industry arose is because people wanted financial rewards for their creations. Whether this is the best possible situation or not is debatable, but it seems to be the way people want it -be get rewarded for their work (this argument also violates Hume's law, however, and is therefore not the ultimate criticism). Moreover, there has been a movement among scholars, at least in Finland, to change the academic system in a sense that scholars can hold copyrights over his/her work. Also, there are many public domain (PD) products around (that are free) made without any intention of gaining material rewards. Does the average person use these more than he uses commercial software? Stallman (who seems to hold a similar view to Weckert in this matter) seems to recognise the problem, as he states that 'if given a change to make a lot of money as well, they will come to expect and demand it' and his postulated cure can be found in the following lines: 'low-paying organisations do poorly in competition with high-paying ones, but they do not have to do badly if the high-paying ones are banned' (Stallman, 1997: 236) This banning of high-paying action may not be a commonly accepted approach, however, e.g. using the Kantian universality rule or the golden rule, principles favoured by Stallman elsewhere. Would you accept that situation where high-paying companies are banned?
Alternative B, a society where the cost of SW is covered by the government (note that governmental ownership of the SW industry, where SW would have to be bought from the government, would not change the situation) we would have the following possibilities, that SW is (I) paid for by the government while being produced by private enterprises, or (II) produced solely by the government, so that non-governmental ~4Of course, this situation depends on countries. However, it is not out of the question that the (SW) companies fund academic scholars. production is not allowed, as in communist systems (IIa), or allowed, but copyright cannot be granted, which would mean that only optional payments could be made to private persons (IIb). Situation (IIb) is favoured by Stallman (1997: 237) , as in his view SW development could be funded by an SW tax levied from everyone buying a computer as a percentage of the purchase price.
Since both situations referred to in case II might cause a decrease in software quality and annual production, it is often argued, based on practical experience, that these arrangements would reduce work motivation and responsibility. This argument can be avoided by stating that motivation is a matter of organisation, i.e. it depends on rewards and other impulses. A pragmatic argument would reject this, however, stating that it has not yet been seen to work in practice. In any case, how can the government meet the needs of everybody? This is likely to create a situation where people's preferences concerning SW cannot be fully fulfilled 15 and if SW is not provided by the government (in the case of IIa), users will not be allowed to own any.
Arrangement B may also reduce free innovation and lead to abuses. Would the government reclaim all the software products in case I, whatever they might be? It is difficult to imagine that all of them could be reclaimed. How can we measure what should be reclaimed? Namely, if copying were free, how could the use of SW be objectively measured? The issuing of free copies of SW from a certain distribution point cannot be guaranteed to work, as people currently seem to copy programs from the Internet, for example. Another alternative, that the government, or an organisation on a mandate from the government, would decide what SW people needed, is unlikely to be a viable approach. Secondly, do people want to pay for all software indirectly in the form of taxes? (or is it fair to claim so?). How about special SW used by companies for simulation purposes, for example, or the space shuttle? Does the average user need to pay the price of these in the forms of taxes? Moreover, in the era of the information society, it is rather easy to pay for a computer through the WWW, thus perhaps avoiding the taxes suggested by Stallman. It is not clear how this problem could be taken care of.
Thirdly, in case B, how would we deal with software developed in different countries? It would be wrong to use the efforts of others for free, and it might imply economic sanctions. Banning certain products could give rise to unauthorised copying or a black market in SW. It is questionable whether a country could redeem software developed in another country that was needed by its citizens and recover the cost in the form of taxes.
It can also be argued that the SW developed in case B would be available to all, independent of their financial situation. In a liberal system, however, there is PD or shareware software (which should not be expensive) for almost every purpose (for ordinary users). Also, on the positive side, non-copyright software could be modified and further developed by end users and its quality might improve as the code would ~sStallman suggests in his scheme that instead of paying direct taxes, people can alternativeIy invest the same money in development of the product that they prefer. But if there is no project for producing SW that satisfies one's preferences, it may be that such preferences cannot reasonably be met. It would be too costly for a minority of people or one person to pay all the costs of SW development, and private development, if it were allowed, can be very risky or limited by the fact that copyright, or more precisely financial acknowledgements, cannot be ensured. be reviewed by the public. There are many examples to indicate that products (or principles behind them) made available for public review are more serviceable than 'secret' developments. This may not necessarily require a state of affairs where SW is free from copyright, however. That is to say, nothing would prevent companies from publishing their principles, protocols, etc. while in scientific forums or sending beta versions of the product around and still holding a copyright on the final product. Also, some products that are necessary or useful may not be developed in a liberal system if they do not have enough market intake (they might be developed in case B). However, partial or full governmental backing with respect to some software is not out of the question in a liberal system. For example, it is common practice in the Nordic social systems, which that have liberal foundations.
Those thinkers who favour alternative B may reject the practical argument, stating that the practical implementation of a good system has miscarried so far. Marx (1844: 136) , regarded the abolition of personal rights as an entirely positive thing. Although Marx's and Engel's thesis on the bourgeois society (1848) is rather embellished with rhetoric, it is true that someone will always suffer in a liberal system -a state of affairs that even Marxism has not been able to eliminate.
However, even if we presume that the above problems with regard to case B were somehow to be overcome, this raises the question of whether people who are in favour of free software in terms of finance are willing to change the current political system towards a system where government owns the means of production.
Conclusion
This paper analyses the relevance of different concepts of SW rights from theoretical foundations to practical applications such as (the latter in terms of) legislation. The so-called 'no right' view was found to be difficult to share, as it amoralises SW and could have detrimental effects on our well-being. The universality thesis, including its variants, is critically considered. The relevance of the current concept in terms of the Western system of legislation with respect to SW rights, such as copyrights and patents, is analysed and the concept of copyright seems to be fairly just, as it is likely to provide equal opportunities. The granting of patents needs to be carefully restricted (as is often done in Western legislation), as slapdash application can result in many undesirable effects, including violation of the freedom of thought. Certain economic and social effects of free SW (i.e. abolition of financial acknowledgements) are also discussed, with the conclusions being that non-commercial software would give rise to sociopolitical changes toward systems that are something other than liberal based (e.g. socialism).
Certain rights of the author, albeit the right to full control is questionable, should be respected at least if they are commonly agreed and can stand up to moral scrutiny. It is shown that free software or allowance of everyone to make a copy of software would lead to changes in all levels of society. Even though one may see this as a convincing goal it is still highly questionable that one could make unauthorised copies on this ground in a society that does not currently have such a state of affairs: there should first be an attempt to change the norms and practices of the society (a state of agreed rights of a kind). Furthermore, this was argued to be advisable since it is not clear that adhering to software copyright in a general sense is unfair, immoral or impolitic and irrelevant -otherwise a personal commitment to obey the law would be justifiable.
